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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-3279 
___________ 
 
INGRID AMALFIS SANTOS-REYES, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                          Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. BIA-1: A043-149-511) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Philip Verrillo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 26, 2011) 
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Orest Bezpalko, II, Esq. 
Bezpalko and Associates 
1500 Walnut Street, Suite 408 
Philadelphia, PA  19125 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Sharon M. Clay, Esq. 
Joseph D. Hardy, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P. O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
 
Blair O’Connor, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Room 2000 
450 5
th
 Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC  20001 
 
  Counsel for Respondent 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
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 Ingrid Amalfis Santos-Reyes asks us to review the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to affirm the 
immigration judge’s pretermition of her application for 
cancellation of removal.  Santos-Reyes maintains that the 
BIA erred by misinterpreting the stop-time rule (8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(d)(1)) resulting in a miscalculation of her years of 
continuous residence.  We will deny the petition. 
 
I. 
 The United States admitted Santos-Reyes, a citizen of 
the Dominican Republic, on October 3, 1991 as a conditional 
permanent resident.  Upon her return to the United States 
from a trip in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security 
charged her with inadmissibility as an alien convicted of a 
crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)), 
arising from her June 9, 1999 conviction for receiving stolen 
property, criminal conspiracy, and criminal solicitation. 
 
 Santos-Reyes, relying upon 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), 
sought cancellation of removal based upon seven years of 
continuous residence.  That provision states as follows:   
 
The Attorney General may cancel 
removal in the case of an alien 
who is inadmissible or deportable 
from the United States if the 
alien-- . . . (2) has resided in the 
United States continuously for 7 
years after having been admitted 
in any status . . . .  
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8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  The government challenged Santos-
Reyes’ application, asserting that the criminal conspiracy in 
which she participated began on August 18, 1998 and 
continued to October 27, 1998, triggering the “stop-time rule” 
and disqualifying her from the relief she sought.  That rule 
says the following: 
 
For purposes of this section, any 
period of continuous residence or 
continuous physical presence in 
the United States shall be deemed 
to end . . . (B) when the alien has 
committed an offense referred to 
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title 
that renders the alien inadmissible 
to the United States under section 
1182(a)(2) of this title or 
removable from the United States 
under section 1227(a)(2) or 
1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever 
is earliest.  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).  The BIA upheld the immigration 
judge’s decision to apply the stop-time rule and pretermit 
Santos-Reyes’ request for cancellation of removal, ruling that 
a conviction record showing August 18, 1998 as the incident 
date established that her criminal conduct occurred before 
seven years of continuous residency had elapsed.  
 
II. 
 Santos-Reyes appeals the BIA’s decision, arguing that 
a lack of specificity about the date of her involvement in the 
5 
 
conspiracy, and ambiguity in the statutory language 
concerning the trigger date for the stop-time rule resulted in 
error by the BIA.  According to Santos-Reyes, the 
Government’s case is grounded in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania’s vague criminal complaint.  The complaint 
refers only to “Jane Doe Number One” and provides only a 
range of dates that encompass all conduct by all conspirators, 
rather than dates relating specifically to Santos-Reyes.  
Relying upon this record, she claims that the BIA erred by 
ruling that she committed the offense on August 18, 1998, the 
date the general conspiracy began. 
 
 Moreover, Santos-Reyes maintains that Congress’ 
construction of the stop-time rule in the present-perfect tense 
makes the referent date for invoking the rule subject to 
interpretation.  Her focus is upon the following line:  
“[C]ontinuous physical presence in the United States shall be 
deemed to end . . . when the alien has committed an offense.” 
Id. (emphasis added).  In light of the supposed ambiguity in 
the stop-time rule, she proposes that the immigration judge 
and the BIA should have calculated her continuous residence 
period using her arrest date, October 31, 1998, because it is 
the only date certain in the record.  Her seven years of 
continuous residence would have elapsed by this date. 
 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, “subject 
to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron . . . . ”  
Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d 
260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984)).  Where, as here, the BIA relies upon the reasoning of 
the immigration judge, we review both the decision of the 
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BIA and the immigration judge.  Sandie v. Attorney General, 
562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We take up the statutory 
interpretation issue first.  
 
III. 
 The present-perfect tense refers to an action that “is 
now completed, or continues up to the present.”  Chicago 
Manual of Style, 16
th
 ed. (2010), p. 236.  Although it is 
conceivable that the perfect tense might open some statutory 
provisions to different interpretations in certain 
circumstances, it does not impact the instant case.    
  
  “Commit” means “[t]o perpetrate or perform.” Oxford 
English Dictionary, Online Edition, June 2011, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37160#eid8745869, last 
visited October 12, 2011.  There is no support for Santos-
Reyes’ assertion that Congress’ use of the word “commit” in 
the present-perfect tense (“has committed”) transforms a 
word that is generally focused upon the subject’s conduct into 
one that refers to the moment when the subject is criminally 
charged for the conduct.   
 
 Moreover, mindful that the United States charged 
Santos-Reyes with inadmissibility, it is instructive that 
Congress described the grounds for inadmissibility as 
follows: 
 
Except as provided in clause (ii), 
any alien convicted of, or who 
admits having committed, or who 
admits committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements 
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of - - (I) a crime involving moral 
turpitude . . . or conspiracy to 
commit such a crime, or (II) a 
violation . . . relating to a 
controlled substance. . . is 
inadmissible.   
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  With respect 
to the word “committed,” the unmistakable focus here is upon 
the alien’s acts that constitute the crime, rather than the 
subsequent arrest.  
  
 As the Supreme Court said:  “[a]mbiguity is a creature 
not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context . . . .”  
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994);  See also Alli v. 
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011).  Here, Congress’ 
choice of verb tense did not dilute the clarity of its intent.  All 
points of reference lead to the conclusion that the phrase “has 
committed” in section 1229b(d)(1) means the stop-time rule 
is triggered either by an alien’s criminal conduct occurring on 
a particular date before the end of the seventh year of 
continuous residence, or conduct that runs up to the date 
when the seventh year of residency ends.  Therefore, we 
reject Santos-Reyes’ assertion that the BIA erred by refusing 
to use her arrest date to determine the residency terminal 
date.
1
 
                                              
1
 Moreover, even were we to find that an ambiguity exists by 
virtue of the use of the present-perfect tense, the BIA’s 
interpretation of the stop-time rule in this case is consistent 
with proper grammar and with other provisions of the statute.  
We, therefore, conclude that it is eminently reasonable for the 
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 Having so ruled, we do not have jurisdiction to review 
the remaining issues of Santos-Reyes’ petition.  She claims 
that her arrest date must be used to determine the applicability 
of the stop-time rule because the record did not establish a 
date certain when she committed the crime.  Yet, the BIA 
concluded that, with respect to Santos-Reyes involvement in 
the conspiracy, “[t]he record sufficiently establishes that 
August 18, 1998, was the commission date.”  We do not have 
jurisdiction to ascertain whether this factual finding was 
supported by substantial evidence.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
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 For all of these reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
                                                                                                     
BIA to interpret the stop-time rule as tied to the date of the 
alien’s criminal conduct. 
 
2
 Santos-Reyes’s brief could be read as asserting that the 
Government never pleaded, and the BIA never determined, a 
date certain for the commencement of her criminal conduct, 
relying instead upon the general range of dates set out in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s criminal complaint that 
applied to all of the co-conspirators.  However, the 
Government pleaded, and the BIA determined, that the date 
for the offending conduct was August 18, 1998.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that this is a purely factual matter, beyond our 
appellate jurisdiction. 
